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Nothing in Respondent's Opposition changes Appellants right to the relief requested on 
this appeal. The errors leading up to the October 26, 2013 verdict were numerous and resulted in 
reversible error. The award against Appellants was unsupported by evidence, not based on proper 
legal standards and violated due process oflaw. The verdict on Count II fraud of$17,000 and 
$500,000 punitive damages (later reduced to $384,000) (Tr.p.970-971) and on Count III breach of 
contract of $111,000 were awarded by a confused jury based on passion and/or prejudice. 
At the beginning of this case, there were two plaintiffs and four claims. By the end of the 
case, there was one plaintiff and two claims. The jury heard and considered evidence, however, 
on four claims and for two plaintiffs ( one who failed to show up at trial). The jury was also 
allowed to consider evidence on fraud allegations that were never pleaded. The jury heard and 
considered evidence on religious beliefs for which no defense was allowed. The jury based a 
breach of contract award on numbers not in evidence. The jury based its entire award on 
evidence that was inadmissible, irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 
Fraud Re Healing 
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The judgment for $17,000 in compensatory and $384,000 (originally $500,000) in 
punitive damages on Count II against both Appellants was, on its face, resultant from passion and 
prejudice. Count II was based, in part, on statements written by Vianna in 1998 detailing her 
belief of how God healed her of cancer, which statements were subsequently heard by 
Respondents in 2006. It is important to note that THINK was not in existence until 2008 - two 
years after the alleged fraudulent statements were made. 
The judgment on Count II for fraud and punitive damages was also based, in part, on 
statements made by Vianna in 2008 of her belief that God healed her from a coma in Italy. The 
judgment also appears to have been based on evidence offered by Respondent to impeach her 
own witness regarding Vianna's statement that God healed her grandson's lung, which was never 
pleaded as part of Count II. 
The lower court and the jury failed to hold Respondent to the law in awarding the 
judgment on Count II because the claim for fraud was not based on specifically pleaded claims or 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court allowed the Respondent to proceed on a 
fraud claim and punitive damages without ever defining the precise fraudulent statements. It was 
and still is a moving target. The award for punitive damages was based solely on the fraud claim 
in Count II. Respondent did not meet her burden for punitive damages either. 
Additionally, the trial court allowed the Respondent to proceed on Count II for fraud on 
religious beliefs in violation of the law. The trial court also improperly shifted the burden to 
Appellants throughout trial to disprove the allegations in Count II instead of requiring 
Respondent to prove her case by clear and convincing evidence. This is particularly problematic 
when punitive damages were awarded on a claim that was not proven by clear and convincing 
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evidence. The burden is even higher for punitive damages. Further, the evidentiary mistakes 
were so highly prejudicial that neither Defendant (Vianna or THINK) were given a fair trial or 
proper opportunity to defend. 
Breach of Contract re Degree 
The judgment on Count III for breach of contract for $111,000 was improper because 
Respondent did not prove all of the elements to establish a breach of an oral contract. The 
evidence at trial showed the Respondent received the benefit of the bargain. She enrolled in and 
paid for classes to learn a technique. She received the training for that technique. She received a 
certificate or degree for that training. It was called a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate of 
Ministry." That's it. She was awarded $111,000 for a change in a title on a plaque. She was able 
to teach and earn money from the minute she finished the training but failed to do so. Those are 
not compensable damages. 
The evidence admitted at trial showed that Respondent agreed to call the degree or 
certificate a "Doctorate of Ministry," which was later changed to a "Masters" certificate. It was 
undisputed that THINK was not an accredited university or college and unable to issue PhD's. 
No meeting of the minds was established as to the definition of"doctorate." RESPONDENT 
argues, disingenuously, that the term "doctorate" meant to her it was an a PhD from an 
unaccredited company after a summer of classes totaling $2,300 - making it the easiest and 
cheapest PhD in the world to earn. She also asks this court to view her damages as comparable to 
the expectation that she would have received had she received a PhD from an accredited 
university. She's comparing apples to oranges. A "Doctorate of Ministry" in Theta Healing is not 
comparable to a "Doctorate in Theology'' from say Duke University for example. Respondent 
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knows that she received the benefit of the bargain regardless of the title of her certificate or 
plaque and the jury erred. 
The $111,000 damages awarded were the result of pure speculation, inadmissible and 
irrelevant evidence and not based on sound legal principals. No evidence was provided in 
discovery or to the jury regarding the value of a per se "Doctorate of Ministry" degree from an 
third party (accredited university or otherwise). Respondent received a certificate of completion 
called a "Masters" instead of a certificate of completion called a "Doctorate." The evidence 
offered at trial showed that the title of a "doctorate" in Theta Healing did not change 
Respondent's ability to take clients for healing services or teach classes in Theta Healing. An 
honorary "doctorate" provided no other benefits to Respondent from which damages could be 
based. 
The Court's dismissal of Count I re fraud in awarding a "Doctorate of Ministry" degree 
and refusal to dismiss Count III based on the same facts establishes the impropriety of the jury's 
award. These claims were identical and pleaded in the alternative - one tort and one contract. 
There was insufficient evidence on both Counts I and III and both should have been dismissed. 
It is clear that the jury's award of $111,000 on Count III was based on clear passion and/or 
prejudice because the Court limited the actual damages sustained to those incurred after May of 
2008 totaling $2,300 in tuition and $22,862.77 in costs. There is simply no basis in law or equity 
for an award five times the amount of actual damages. The $111,000 award is more akin to 
punitive damages than contract damages. The judgment on Count III must be reversed. 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
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A. THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED. 
1. There was no basis for damages awarded by the Jury. 
Respondent fails to address the fact that damages on Count III are improper in their 
entirety because Respondent received a "Masters" degree instead of a "Doctorate in Ministry." 
Tr.p.279,L.7-22. Respondent agreed to accept the designation of "Master" of Theta Healing. Tr. 
p. 659. Three years after she accepted the "Theta Healing Master" designation, she filed her 
lawsuit. She never alleged that she received nothing. She acknowledges that she received a 
degree- it was just named something different. She still received the benefit of her bargain. She 
signed up for classes. She paid $2,300 for that class. She did not sign up for the class with the 
expectation of a "doctorate" degree. That decision to award a title to the certificate or plaque 
being offered by THINK came after the class. There was no reliance. Respondent received the 
training and a certificate she paid for. There is no basis upon which she can even claim damages 
in this case. 
The sole issue argued by Respondent was the definition of the word "Doctorate of 
Ministry" as opposed to "Masters" in Theta Healing. Respondent failed to prove what part of the 
contract she was denied from receiving. Respondent relies on Corder v. State Farmway, 133 
Idaho 353 in support of her argument that there was a meeting of the minds in the instant case 
that Respondent would be awarded a PhD doctorate degree. R. Brief p. 18. The Corder case is 
not analogous to the present case. That case dealt with a written lease agreement that was 
performed but never signed. Id. p. 362. The specific agreed-upon terms of the lease were at 
issue. There was substantial evidence of a contract given the parties' written document and 
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course of performance. There is no written agreement in the present case. There was insufficient 
evidence as to a meeting of the minds on the critical definition of what is a "Doctorate of 
Ministry" plaque or certificate or degree. There was no credible evidence that it is a PhD from an 
accredited university. THINK is a private company. Respondent chose the term "Doctorate of 
Ministry" herself. 
Respondent and Appellant clearly had very different understandings of what a per se 
"doctorate" plaque or award means. Respondent Alexander had two years of classes from 2006-
2008 to investigate and understand what kind of "certificates" or "degrees" were being awarded. 
She is an educated plaintiff and has a master's degree from an accredited university. She even 
received multiple "certificates" for each of the classes at THINK between 2006-2008. She knew 
THINK was not offering PhD's. 
Respondent's argument on the award of a "Doctorate of Ministry" further supports 
Appellant's argument regarding religious liberties because the word "ministry" is only used for 
theology or divinity. It is religious. There is no "Doctorate of Ministry" for scientific degrees. A 
"Doctorate of Ministry" is awarded after a course of study in religion. 
2. The damage award for $111,000.00 on the Breach of Contract claim was 
speculative and uncertain. 
The Court limited the actual damages sustained on Count III to those incurred costs 
incurred after May of 2008 totaling $2,300 in tuition and $22,862.77 in costs. There is simply no 
basis in law or equity for an award of $111,000 - five times the amount of actual damages. This 
award is akin to punitive damages and was not based in law or fact. 
Expectation damages/lost profits. 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg.9 
Respondent seemingly relies on Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100 (2011) in support of her 
argument that the jury's large award was proper expectation damages. R. Brief p.17. She argues 
that the jury was free to award approximately $85,000.00 in expectation damages. Id. She offers 
no calculation or evidence in support. The issue is really what value the non-breaching party 
expected from the contract, i.e., what value did Respondent expect to receive from the change in 
the title of the certificate from "doctorate" to "masters." Id. These are very different facts than the 
ones set forth in Erhart, which involved a personal injury case with damages for loss of 
consortium with a large award. This case is only relevant as far as it cites to general principles on 
damage calculations and is not a proper basis to compare a large loss of consortium award to that 
of a breach of contract claim with a change in the title of a certificate. 
An award for damages may be upheld on appeal only where there is sufficient evidence 
supporting the award and the damages were proven to a reasonable certainty. Sells v. Robinson, 
141 Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99, 106 (2005) (citing Bumgarner v. Bumgarner,124 Idaho 629, 
641,862 P.2d 321,333 (Ct.App.1993)); Inland Group of Companies v. Providence Washington 
Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,257, 985 P.2d 674,682 (1999)(citing Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 
280,923 P.2d 981,987 (1996)) ("Compensatory damages for lost profits and future earnings must 
be shown with a reasonable certainty."). 
The expectation damages had to be based on admissible evidence on the underlying 
claim. The claim was a breach of contract claim - an oral contract. The evidence showed that 
Respondent paid for classes and received a certificate or degree. The title of that degree is the 
only issue she has with the breach of contract. She does not allege that she did not receive any 
degree. She does not allege she did not take the training for which she paid $2,300 in tuition. 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg. 10 
There was no evidence as to what she could have "expected" to earn with her certificate called a 
"Doctorate of Ministry'' as opposed to a "Masters" in Theta Healing. 
Respondent did not introduce any evidence on lost profits or future earnings as it related 
to a change in title for her plaque. There simply was no evidence from which the jury could base 
their award other than pure speculation. Respondent testified she was making $800/day as a 
technology consultant. She could earn that anywhere, anytime. She chose not to take clients 
while she was on her "personal healing journey." There is no basis in law to hold Appellant's 
liable for Respondent's own choices. The argument that the jury was "free to value a doctorate 
degree" is wrong. There was no testimony, no expert, no statistics, no charts, no evidence 
whatsoever to establish the "value of a doctorate degree" in Theta Healing as opposed to the 
"Masters" in Theta Healing that she was awarded. 
Respondent points to evidence that a "teacher in Theta Healing would be able to charge 
$500.00-$1960.00 per student per class." She is a teacher in Theta Healing. She provides no 
evidence that a "Doctorate of Ministry" would have garnered more money per student than the 
"Masters" certificate that she received. A teacher is only as good as he/she can teach. An 
independent contractor is only as good as they can advertise, market and sell her own services. 
As a Theta Healing instructor, Respondent is an independent contractor and a licensee of the 
modality. She is responsible for her own business. There was no evidence presented to show that 
she was denied students or had to take less money per student as a result of the title of her 
certificate. 
Respondent's claim that the contract damages were supported by future lost profits was 
not proven. Generally, profits which would have been realized if a contract had been performed 
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may be recovered as damages for its breach, provided they are susceptible of being ascertained 
with reasonable certainty and their loss may reasonably be supposed to have been within 
contemplation of defaulting party at time contract was made as a probable result of its breach. 
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014, Idaho 1986. In this case, the 
contract was performed because Respondent still received her degree - it was just called 
something else. Respondent voted on the new name of a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate." 
Respondent points to no evidence in support of her argument as to what the Respondent could 
make if the "Doctorate of Ministry" degree in Theta Healing had been issued. 
The only damages from which the jury could base its $111,000.00 award on Count III was 
from testimony offered, over objection, by Respondent as to what she purportedly made on a 
daily basis. This evidence was not provided in discovery, it was not provided before trial but was 
provided after numerous objections as to the credibility and supportability of this evidence. Lost 
wages must be proven with reasonable certainty, not based on hypothetical or speculative proof, 
but rather on substantial and competent evidence. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d at 
374. The Court improperly ruled that she could testify without having provided information 
contrary to the Court Order and the Appellant could then argue that the damages were 
speculative. Tr.p.576 L.21-p. 578 L.25. Respondent's speculation as to her lost wages without 
any support was highly prejudicial to the jury. 
Lack of causation. 
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that she was injured, but that her injury 
was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with 
reasonable certainty. See Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110,116,982 P.2d 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg. 12 
945,951 (Ct.App.1999); cf. Gillingham Constr. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr., lnc.,142 Idaho 15, 26, 
121 P.3d 946, 957 (2005) (upholding award of damages where plaintiff presented substantial 
evidence of causation). 
Respondent still cannot point to evidence to support her testimony that she had loss of 
income resulting.from the breach of contract totaling $96,000.00. Respondent was certified in 
the Theta Healing energy healing modality in 2006 - two years before any alleged promise of a 
"doctorate" degree. She took classes for two years and was certified to teach to generate income 
from her Theta Healing services. She received the training she paid for and received the 
certificate called a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate in Ministry." Respondent testified she was 
earning 1/2 of what she was earning in 2008 by 2013 because she chose her own career path. If a 
lawyer leaves a big law firm and joins a small one in the hopes of a better quality of life, he can't 
later sue that big law firm for loss of income based upon his own change of career or firm 
location. 
Respondent did not prove causation. She refused to work. She decided to change careers. 
She was certified to teach and decided not to teach. She was certified to be a practitioner in 2006 
and chose not to take clients. She chose not to work as an independent contractor during her 
classes in 2008 or between 2008 to trial in 2013. There are no grounds for expectation damages, 
lost profits or any other damages in this case. There was no calculation presented to the jury as to 
the $111,000 award. It was purely speculative and clearly erroneous. The Court failed to rectify 
the mistake made by the jury and the claim should be dismissed on appeal. 
B. THE JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES FOR FRAUD AND PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES MUST BE REVERSED. 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg. 13 
1. The Fraud claim should have been dismissed for lack of specificity. 
Respondent has no real opposition to the fact that her claims were never pleaded with 
specificity. Such an argument is impossible to make based on the record. In ruling on 
Appellant's Summary Judgment Motion, the Trial Court held that Respondent had failed to 
properly plead Count II (Fraudulent misrepresentations - healing) with specificity. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7 citing to Tr.p.42 (January 17, 2013 Hearing, p. 80:1-6). The Court cautioned counsel 
that Respondent must prove the specific fraud and that she relied on the specific representation 
and would be prohibited from bringing in evidence of any statements that had nothing to do with 
their claims. Id. at p. 45. A Motion in Limine was filed by Appellants' requesting, once again, 
that Respondent specify what specific fraudulent misrepresentations were made and the who, 
what, when, how and where those were made. A. Brief, p. 7, Tr. p. 37. 
Respondent's testimony at trial was that the fraudulent statements were made in 2006 in a 
book (first published in 1998) titled "Go Up and Seek God," that contained statements regarding 
Vianna's personal journey to God and healing cancer. Tr. p. 227. Her testimony was that reading 
this book induced her to take more classes. Id. The other alleged fraudulent statements were 
made at some other unspecified time and place and/or she "heard" them from students in class. 
Tr. p. 218-220. At trial, the actual text of the book containing the statements was introduced. The 
actual statements made in that book were "[i]n August 1995, I was diagnosed with bone cancer; 
and it was believed I had a tumor in my right femur. Every test the doctors performed showed 
the tumor, and a local bone specialist told me he had only seen two other cases like mine. He told 
me that amputation might be my only option if I wanted to life, and even then there was no 
guarantee." Tr. p. 438. The same book further detailed Vianna's prayer to God-hence the title 
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"Go Up And Seek God" - and how she believes that God healed her leg of cancer. (Exh. 24-25). 
These specific alleged fraudulent statements were never made a part of Respondent's pleadings 
but introduced at trial as the exact statements of fraud. 
Respondent's failure to specifically amend her complaint to allege that the actual 
statements in the "Go Up And Seek God" book as the specific fraudulent misrepresentations 
should be fatal to her claims. This is the moving target approach of Respondent's trial. She was 
not required to specify what the precise fraud was that she was alleging and never specifically 
alleged it, even after the opportunity to amend her complaint after trial. She had this information 
available to her in 2006 - five years before she filed her lawsuit - so she could have put 
Vianna/THINK on notice that the source of the fraudulent misrepresentations and allowed those 
claims to actually be subject to the earlier dispositive motions in the trial court. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motion in Limine because Respondent failed 
to properly plead her fraud claims with specificity. She was allowed to present facts and 
evidence to the jury that had nothing to do with the specific fraud claims, which was highly 
prejudicial and confusing to the jury. Appellants' also brought a Motion for Directed Verdict on 
the same lack of specificity grounds, and a Motion for New Trial/Remittitur and/or JNOV. The 
Trial Court improperly denied each of those motions. 
2. The Fraud claim should be barred by the statute of limitations 
Respondent's failure to specifically plead her allegations of fraud make Appellant's claim 
that her case is barred by the statute of limitations ripe for decision. A. Brief. p. 44. She failed to 
specify when, where, how and to whom the alleged fraudulent statements were made until her 
testimony at trial. This defense could not have been raised earlier. It was raised in substance in 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg. 15 
Appellant's prior arguments, although not specifically titled Statute of Limitations. A. Brief, p. 
44. A defense barring a claim should be considered by this court as it relates to the lower court's 
jurisdiction to hear the claim in the first place. 
3. Respondent's Fraud claim should have been dismissed for lack of 
evidence. 
Respondent's opposition does not change the fact that she failed to meet her burden on 
Count II. The allegations in Count II that were allowed to go to the jury were that Vianna made 
representations that: (1) she healed herself of cancer; (2) pulled herself out of a coma in Italy; (3) 
healed herself from heart disease; and (4) could make liquids appear in containers." R.Vol.l,p.21 
paragraphs 25-28. A fifth claim that "Vianna claims to have healed her grandson's lung" was 
introduced as improper impeachment evidence (for Respondent's own witness), never pleaded as 
a fraud claim and was improperly argued to the jury as such. Tr.p.235,L.2-7. The Court even 
used this evidence in denying the motion for a new trial. 
Every element of a fraud claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. A. 
Brief p. 23. The elements of fraud are (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the 
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner; (6) the listener's 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the 
listener's right to rely on the truth; (9) the listener's consequent and proximate injury. Galaxy 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Dept., (1985) 109 Idaho 692,696. Fraud 
cannot be established on religious based beliefs because it is impossible to prove the truth or 
falsity ofreligious based beliefs. A. Brief p. 29. Further, Respondent had no right to rely on 
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statements made from religious beliefs. In matters of faith and religion, it is typical for people to 
make statements regarding the power of God that are difficult, if not impossible, to prove. They 
are also protected free speech. 
a. Fraud Allegation Re Coma In Italy. 
Respondent did not meet her burden at trial to prove all of the elements of fraud with 
respect to this allegation with clear and convincing evidence. The pleaded allegation was the 
Vianna stated she pulled herself out of a coma in Italy in 2008. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311. 
The actual statement made was that God with the help of her husband and doctors pulled her out 
of the coma. Tr. p. 836117-12; p.4281118-12; p. 429; 111-6. Remarkably, the Respondent failed 
to provide any evidence as to any sort of statement that was made to her or how she relied on it to 
her detriment. Tr. p. 225 11 5-21. 
The evidence presented at trial via Guy Stibal was that he saw his wife in a coma in Italy. 
Tr. p., 667. He was at the hospital, he held her limp hands, he saw her still body lying on the bed. 
Id. The testimony further indicated that Vianna was placed in the infectious disease ward and 
was in a coma in the hospital for three days. Tr. p. 667. Vianna testified that she believed the 
doctors, Guy's voice and God brought her out of the coma. Tr. p. 836 and 875. 
The Court and jury both confused the respective burdens as to the elements of fraud here 
because Respondent had the burden to prove every element with clear and convincing evidence. 
A. Brief, p. 25. Whether Vianna was in a coma or not is not the sole issue. It's whether Vianna 
believed her statements to be true when she made them. Her statements she was in a coma in 
Italy and that God helped her out of a coma is true from her perspective. There was no credible 
evidence to the contrary. 
Appellant's Reply Brief Pg. 17 
Respondent admitted that she did not rely on the statement that Vianna pulled herself out 
of a coma in Italy because she testified that: "the coma came at the end. That was not as strong 
because I was -- that happened to Vianna in the midst of the period of time that I was taking 
classes." Tr. p. 225. Respondent's allegation fails on this element alone because, by her own 
admission, the statement did not induce her to take classes or to otherwise act. The evidence 
presented at trial showed that Respondent did not prove each element of this claim by clear and 
convincing evidence. In addition, there was no evidence presented as to the consequent and 
proximate injury relating to how this statement induced Respondent to take any further classes. 
The Trial Court's ruling on Appellant's Motion for New Trial shows that Respondent failed 
to meet its burden on this claim: "the evidence regarding the coma in Italy is conflicting and the 
extent of the coma and how she recovered is also unclear." Respondent cannot meet its burden to 
prove this claim by clear and convincing evidence if the "evidence is conflicting and unclear." R. 
Vo. III, p. 416. The Court erred and the jury erred. 
b. Fraud Allegation Re Heart Disease. 
Respondent alleged that part of her Count II fraud claim involves a statement by Vianna 
that she healed herself from heart disease. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement 
Vianna made was that "God healed my heart disease." Tr. p. 693, 836, 849, 865. 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Vianna was diagnosed in 2006 with 
"congestive heart failure and diastolic dysfunction according to Dr. Gorman's records" and that 
she understood that people can die from this condition. Tr. p. 865. Vianna testified that she 
believed the medication and God healed her heart condition. Tr. p. 863-865. 
In support of this claim, Respondent relies on the testimony of an oncologist interpreting 
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medical records from Vianna's cardiologist from 2006. Dr. Shull did not speak to Vianna's 
cardiologist, examine Vianna nor speak to her about her health. Tr. p. 491. The sum total of 
evidence provided is as follows: 
Q: (BY MR. JOHNSTON): So the last report from Dr. Gorman you saw, she was still 
suffering from congestive heart failure? 
A: (BY DR. SHULL): Yes. 
Tr. p. 4871116-18. 
That last report was in 2006. The trial was in 2013. IfVianna was still suffering from 
congestive heart failure in 2013, she would be dead. The actual evidence was that Vianna had 
congestive heart failure and took medication. She testified that she believed her heart corrected 
itself. She said that "the medication became too much for me. It actually shut down my kidneys 
and I ended up in the hospital and that's when they realized my heart was completely better ... I 
have a clean bill of health from Dr. Gorman." Tr. p. 854. There was no evidence to rebut 
Vianna's belief that her heart is healed or that God healed it. 
Respondent's claim fails for lack of evidence on these elements: (2) there was no false 
statement of fact - Vianna had congestive heart failure and she believes it was healed; ( 4) Vianna 
did not know the statement to be false - she was told her heart is in perfect condition now by Dr. 
Gorman; (5) Vianna did not contemplate reliance by Respondent on this specific statement to 
continue her classes at THINK because she did not make the statement directly to Respondent; 
(9) Respondent was not injured as a result of this statement. The Trial Court erred in denying this 
claim on all of the motions brought by Appellants, including the Directed Verdict and the Motion 
for New Trial/Remittitur/JNOV. This claim should have never been presented to the jury for 
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damages because Respondent did not and cannot prove this claim by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
c. Fraud Allegation Re Cancer. 
Respondent's Brief does not cite to clear and convincing evidence sufficient to prove each 
element of on Count II regarding the allegation that Vianna believes God healed her cancer. The 
specific allegation made by Respondent in the Complaint was the statement by Vianna that she 
healed herself of cancer. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement Vianna made was 
that God healed her cancer. Tr. p. 693 11 9-11; Tr. p. 836113-6; Tr. p. 84911 14-16, Ex. 24-25. 
Vianna testified she wrote her book "Go Up And Seek God" in 1998 which detailed her personal 
journey and medical history from her own personal journal that she wrote at the time she was 
going through her cancer ordeal. Tr. 869-870. In essence, she wrote the book from her diary and 
was sued for fraud because someone read that diary. Id. At the time she wrote the book, there 
was no THINK and there were no classes offered to anyone. It was just a book. 
Respondent's Brief does not offer any dispute of what the medical records established at 
trial: Vianna had a 9-inch tumor in the bone in her leg with "cancer cells" in the tumor. Tr. p. 
492, LI 1-24; Tr. 496, 11 15-23. The medical records contained words like "sarcoma," 
"lymphoma," "malignant." The evidence established that Vianna was told that she needed 
chemotherapy, radiation and/or amputation to save herlife. Tr.p. 785,L.6-20.; 837, L.1-p. 839, 
L.9. 840, L.6-21; 841, L.2-20, 795,L.22-p.796,L.10; 795,L.22-p.797,L.l 7; 847, L.5-21; Tr.p.588, 
L.5-18. Both experts testified that her belief that she had cancer was reasonable. Tr. p. 492, 11 11-
24; Tr. 496, 11 15-23. The statement that "In August 1995, I was diagnosed with bone cancer" 
was true from Vianna's perspective. She lived through a terrible ordeal. Tr. p. 593 11 1-4. The 
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statement that "I had cancer" and/or "I was diagnosed with cancer" is the same statement to a lay 
person. These facts cause Respondent's fraud claim fail as a matter oflaw. 
Contrary to Respondent's incomplete recitation of the record regarding the testimony of 
Blake McDaniel (R. Briefp. 26), Vianna's ex-husband, Blake McDaniel, actually testified that 
Vianna's doctors told both of them that they found "dead cancer cells" in her biopsy. Tr. p. 588 II 
16-18. Blake McDaniel testified that the doctor's told Vianna it was "some type of cancer based 
on what they think is going on." Tr. p. 588 II 23-25. He told the jury that a second biopsy was 
recommended. Tr. p. 588 II 16-18. The jury is required to draw all reasonable inferences from 
the evidence. There is only one answer as to why doctor's who find dead cancer cells recommend 
a second biopsy, or chemotherapy, or suggest amputation or radiation - the patient has cancer. 
Common sense dictates that the finding of dead cancer cells in a 9-inch tumor means there 
are live ones elsewhere in the tumor or body. Those are the reasonable inferences required of the 
jury. Common sense further dictates that no husband in his right mind would tell a child their 
mom will die based on a "cancer scare" but an actual diagnosis. The key point here is the effect 
on the listeners-laypeople hearing that there are dead cancer cells, sarcoma, lymphoma, 
malignant clearly would lead one to believe that they had cancer or were "diagnosed" with 
cancer. Tr. p. 691 II 7-9. The evidence established that Vianna, Blake and their children believed 
she would die from her cancer. Id. 
Nothing in Respondent's Brief changes the fact that Vianna had a 9-inch tumor and it was 
healed without significant medical treatment. The evidence at trial showed that Vianna believed 
that God healed her leg when she prayed to him and went into her meditation. That is a belief 
protected under the U.S. Constitution and cannot be tried in a court oflaw by a judge or jury (as 
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set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief). No judge or jury can prove the existence of God or of a 
miracle. Vianna's beliefs in God cannot be the basis for a fraud claim. A. Brief p. 31. This is 
part and parcel the reason for the protections on freedom ofreligion and freedom of speech. 
In sum, Respondent's Brief does not cite to clear and convincing evidence on the 
allegations of fraud that "Vianna healed herself of cancer, i.e., God healed her cancer" and this 
claim still fails as a matter oflaw because there was insufficient evidence on elements: (2) no 
false statement of fact because Vianna believed she was diagnosed with cancer; (3) not material 
to Respondent's decisions to take classes because the statement was made in 1998 and again in 
2006 after Respondent was already in class; ( 4) Vianna did not know the statement was false 
because she believed it was true; (5) Vianna did not contemplate reliance by Respondent on the 
statement to continue her classes at THINK because Vianna did not make the statement directly 
to Respondent; (8) Respondent did not have a right to rely on the statement because she is an 
educated person and had three years during her classes to see decide for herself whether to 
continue to take classes based on the statements; (8A) Respondent did not have a right to rely on 
the statements because they are based in faith and a believe that God can heal others; and (9) 
Respondent was not injured as a result of this statement because she failed to prove damages and 
causation. 
d. Fraud Allegation Re Liquids. 
This claim should have been dismissed on Directed Verdict. The allegation in the 
Complaint was the statement that Vianna can make liquids appear in containers. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; 
Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement was that God can make liquids appear. She could have just 
said that she believes God parted the Red Sea for Jesus. It's a similar belief and it's religious. 
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Evidence was excluded on both sides. There was no evidence presented on this claim. This was 
highly prejudicial to the jury because it was not stricken and the jury could have very well made 
the entire decision on fraud based on this as Respondent even points out in her brief. 
e. Evidence regarding Grandson's lung was improperly 
characterized and relied upon as a separate Fraud 
claim. 
Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint contained the allegation that Vianna 
represented that she healed her grandson's lung problem. (See, e.g., R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 
311 ). This allegation also was not mentioned as part of the Complaint or having anything to do 
with it at any point prior to trial. The Court specifically stated "what you can't do is bring in 
claims that you have learned that had absolutely nothing to do with your client's claims." Tr. p. 
451111-13. 
This evidence was inappropriately allowed in evidence as "impeachment" evidence only 
and not a claim for fraud - Mr. Johnson: "it is offered to impeach that testimony that she never 
actually treated him." Tr. p.520119-16. This was not even proper impeachment evidence 
because Vianna never made this statement or claim in her testimony. He was introducing this 
evidence to bolster his own witness (which is not impeachment). Respondent's Brief alleges that 
this issue was not previously raised by the Appellant. This issue was argued, however, on p. 29 
of the Appellant's Appeal Brief, so Respondent's argument is simply false. 
The entirety of evidence on this claim was referenced vaguely in Respondent Alexander 
testimony: "Vianna's grandson was hospitalized with a serious pulmonary issue and Vianna said 
she worked on him and his lungs were perfect." Tr. p. 235 11 2-7. Lindsay Stock, Vianna's ex-
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daughter in law, then testified as to the efficacy of theta healing for her grandson, which was 
excluded in the Court's order but considered by the jury. Tr. p. 559112-25; 560; 561 111-11. 
There was no evidence submitted that the statement was made directly to Respondent, no 
evidence was made that the statement was made with the intent to induce Respondent to take 
classes at THINK. The Trial Court was confused as to this evidence as well because the Court 
erroneously considered it as a "fraud allegation" in denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial. R. 
Vol. 3, p. 416. The Trial Court actually relied on an unpleaded allegation that it allowed in as 
only impeachment evidence as another whole entire fraud claim. This illustrates the confusion by 
the judge and jury as to what the scope of the actual claims brought by Respondent. 
4. Punitive Damages were improper. 
A fundamental error of law was made when the trial court granted the second motion for 
punitive damages and allowed the jury to make such an award. The Appellants' initial brief sets 
forth the standards for allowing punitive damages. The Appellant argued in that initial brief that 
the motion for a punitive amendment should have been denied as it was months earlier, that the 
Trial Court should have granted the Motion for New Trial on the issue of punitive damages and; 
the Trial Court failed to properly reduce the amount. The Respondent raises no new issues to 
address except on the issue of punitive calculation. 
In the Response Brief at page 45, the Respondent says that "$384,000.00 is a modest sum 
to protect this interest." The interest referred to is the State of Idaho's interest. The issue most 
concerning to the Appellant is how the Trial Court determined that $384,000.00 was the proper 
amount to award. The Court merely multiplied the award of economic damages on all claims by 
three (3) and came up with the number. R. Vo. 3, p. 419. This was a statutory adjustment without 
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any analysis into what the proper award should be. 
As stated-punitive damages should never have been considered but, assuming arguendo, 
there was a basis for punitive damages, it was still erroneously awarded: 
·The Court did not analyze the amount versus the conduct. He merely multiplied special 
damages by three (3). A Brief p. 32-34; 
·The Court relied on contract damages. It was the Court's previous order that punitive 
damages would only be heard with respect to the fraud claim. Tr. p. 13 11 7-11. Both the 
Court and counsel agree that punitive damages are only being considered with respect to 
the fraud allegations not the contract claim. As this is the case, the contract damage 
cannot be used as a variable in determining the punitive damage amount. The fraud 
damages were $17,000. The award of$384,000 was an error oflaw. 
The Respondent fails to analyze or address these fundamental mistakes made by the trial court 
and instead relies on general arguments on contract damages. The law governing damages is 
ignored by the Respondent and unfortunately it was ignored by the trial court as well. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE CAUSING 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANTS. 
The Court very clearly held that: 
"it has never been my position in trying this case that the believability in the general 
sense of the Defendant, Ms. Stibal, whether or not she is a successful healer or not, is the issue of 
this case. That she is or is not is not the issue of this case." The specific statements that she has 
made upon which your client has claimed reliance and now claims damage are an issue in the 
case as to whether or not those statements were made and whether or not those statements were 
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true. But whether or not she may or may not have healed others and whether or not she could 
perform a healing here in the courtroom, I had already indicated, I would not allow." Tr. p. 650 11 
1-11. 
The judge stated in his order that "the efficacy of Theta Healing was not on trial in this 
case." However, the story about the grandson's lung put on trial the "efficacy of theta healing." 
The claims of fraud involved the "efficacy of theta healing," i.e., Vianna healed herself of cancer, 
Vianna healed herself of heart disease, Vianna brought herself out of a coma. All of those 
allegations directly involve the efficacy of Theta Healing because that is how she claims to have 
healed herself in conjunction with the doctors and her faith and prayers to God. Respondents 
were allowed to present evidence (as noted above) on the "efficacy of theta healing" and yet 
Appellant's were not allowed to present any evidence in defense of these claims re the "efficacy 
of theta healing." Appellant had witnesses lined up to testify that they were healed by Vianna's 
Theta Healing techniques but the Court disallowed this testimony. This refusal to allow 
Vianna/THINK to defend against the allegations was highly prejudicial and confusing to the jury. 
The confusion is further evidenced in the Trial Court's ruling on the Motion for New Trial and 
motion for JNOV. R. Vol. 3, p. 416. 
In paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Respondent alleges that Vianna did not heal herself, did 
not have the ability to heal others, and that her stories were false. R. Vol. 1, p. 22. Respondent 
was allowed to introduce evidence to support this claim, but Appellant was not allowed to have 
any witnesses to testify on her behalf that Theta Healing was a good effective practice. The Trial 
Court's refusal to allow this testimony was extremely prejudicial. 
D. A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF LAW WAS MADE IN ALLOWING THE 
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ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO GO TO THE JURY. 
Respondent's brief fails to accurately oppose the issue ofreligious beliefs. The issue of 
religious beliefs was adequately raised in the lower court. Count II for fraud was based on the 
statements that "God healed me." Count III for breach of contract involves a claim over a 
"Doctorate of Ministry" plaque. The entire case is based on Vianna's religious beliefs and her 
religious teachings. Theta Healing is a meditation technique developed by Vianna to allow others 
to connect with God. Her books are titled "Go Up and Seek God." The word "God" was 
mentioned on at least 49 pages of the record. Tr. pp. 10, 21, 22, 31, 44, 65, 115, 160, 162, 164, 
166,197,226,230,403,429,431,432,434,435,438,439,440,441,443,444,445,570,693, 
724,829,830,831,833,836,839,844,849,850,861,865,866,874,875,922,944,948,949, 
950. Appellant properly raised the issue of religious liberty in the court below multiple times and 
was denied consideration of this issue. In fact, her religious beliefs were put on trial and 
erroneously decided by the jury. Punitive damages were awarded due to her free exercise of her 
right to free speech and free exercise ofreligious beliefs. This issue is ripe and timely and should 
properly be decided on appeal. 
In denying the initial motion for punitive damages, Judge Watkins stated that "[t]he Court 
believes that going into the program, everyone admits that Theta Healing is a religion and with 
the elements of personal faith ... so the Court is uncomfortable in granting leave to amend to 
include punitive damages." (Judge Watkins Hearing on SMJ/Status Conference p. 99: 11-14). 
Judge Watkins also ruled that "if faith is part of the program or teachings, and the Plaintiffs 
concede that, then it makes the task of establishing an extremely harmful state of mind extremely 
difficult." Appellants Brief, p. 30. 
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Respondent's contention that this Court cannot consider the issue of religious liberty is 
misplaced. The cases cited by Respondent in support of her argument are not persuasive. First, 
the court in Gardner v. Bartshi, 139 Idaho 430, 436 found that "Bartschi also contends that the 
Court should not address this issue [i.e. statute of frauds defense] as it was not raised before the 
district court. However, after a review of the record, it appears that Garner and Flinders Realty 
did raise this issue arguing that either estoppel or quasi-estoppel should be used to avoid the 
unjust results of the statute of frauds in their supplemental briefing before the district court." The 
issue was argued in principle and raised adequately just like the present case. A. Brief_. 
Respondent's argument that the "exception of fundamental error only applies to criminal 
and quasi-criminal cases" is simply wrong. R. Brief, p. 12. If the Court accepted Respondent's 
own misinterpretation of the law, it would mean that no constitutional rights would exist for any 
civil litigants. The U.S. constitution covers all litigants - whether civil or criminal. The definition 
of "fundamental error" was taken from criminal cases but the case does not state that it "only 
applies to criminal cases" or that it cannot be used in civil cases where religious liberties are at 
issue. In fact, the Court in State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, found that the exceptions to the rule that 
"[g]enerally the Court will not consider on appeal any issues that are not raised by the parties" 
may be applied for "certain issues in certain types of cases. 11 Id. at *536;Crane Creek Country 
Club v. City of Boise, 121 Idaho 485,487,826 P.2d 446,448 (1990)(Bakes, C.J., specially 
concurring) (an issue not raised in the trial court or on appeal may be addressed when plain or 
fundamental error exists). Crane Creek Country Club is a civil case and not a criminal one. 
Fundamental error is error which "so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest 
injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process." State v. Sheahan, 
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139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003). The Court in State v. Doe, supra, found that 
"[w]hile this is not a criminal case, the magistrate court's error in applying the incorrect standard 
affects Doe's fundamental right to raise his own child and violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." The same is true in Appellant's case - she was denied her fundamental 
rights to her own free exercise of religious beliefs and free speech and denied the opportunity to 
defend the claims made against her. Respondent further claims that "the ruling from In Re Doe, 
330 P.3d 1040, appears to overturn the Court's ruling in State v. Doe upon which Appellant's 
rely." R. Brief p. 12. When cite checking this case at the time of this Reply, there is no "negative 
history" for State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534 and the In Re Doe case is not reported on Westlaw. 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, forcing a person to prove or disprove the existence of God 
and/or that God heals people violated Appellant's constitutional rights and rights of due process 
of law. This certainly rises to the level of error in State v. Doe that "so profoundly distort the trial 
that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due 
process." It also sets a dangerous legal precedent in Idaho if allowed to remain. 
The Courts may not consider whether the party's purportedly religious beliefs are true or false. 
State v. Cordingly (Idaho 2013) 302 P. 3d 730. 
Contrary to Respondent's arguments, the Idaho Code does not require Theta Healing to be 
a 501(c)(3) for tax purposes in order to obtain protection under the FERPA. Idaho Code Section 
73-401(2). In addition, Respondent's argument that Theta Healing cannot be a religion because 
it's also based in science is equally flawed. There are a number of per se religions that are based 
in scientific principles without any deity at all. A. Brief p. 29. 
Respondent attempts to argue the Meyer's factors is misplaced. All of the evidence cited 
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by Respondent on P. 32 of its brief were evidenced in Vianna's book "Go Up and Seek God" and 
her subsequent books that are part of the evidence. The videos and other brochures that were 
admitted into evidence establish a prayer before and after each class session and meet the 1\1eyers 
test. The meditation technique itself is focused prayer to God. The problem with the argument 
under the Meyers test is that Appellant was denied the opportunity to have a fair hearing under 
Meyers. The second punitive damages motion was granted the day before trial. The Court 
denied Appellant's any further argument on religious grounds. 
Accordingly, the issue of religious beliefs was properly raised in the trial court. "To 
properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the 
issue must have been raised in the court below, [sic] an issue cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal." Garner v. Bartschi,139 Idaho 430,436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) (citingMcPheters v. 
Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003)). Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), a trial court may 
grant a new trial for "excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Clearly an award of $500,000 by 
the jury (later reduced to $384,000) in punitive damages was excessive and awarded under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. There is absolutely no correlation between $17,000 and 
$500,000. The award was unconstitutional, erroneous and must be reversed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be dismissed for the reasons cited in 
Appellant's Opening Brief and herein and the requested relief granted to Appellants or as this 
court deems just and proper. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'ZZ..day of December, 2014. 
Dennis P. Wilkinson, ESQ. 
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